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Abstract
This article addresses debates in contemporary industrial relations about practical
application of pluralism. We compare the potential efficacy of ‘radical-pluralism’ and
‘neo-pluralism’. Data comes from analysis of employment relationships in two unionised
public transport sector organisations, in the comparative country contexts of the UK
and Republic of Ireland. It is argued that radical-pluralist framing of the employment
relationship is better equipped than neo-pluralism to provide deeper and contextually
sensitive understandings of the realities of unequal employment relationships. Desired
(pluralist) democratic values differ from real world application of joint regulation
(praxis). This raises implications regarding constraints on state regulation and public
policy goals institutionalising pluralism as fluid and uneven praxis.
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‘Frames of reference’ have attracted considerable debate in contemporary indus-
trial relations literature (Ackers, 2014, 2019; Budd, 2020; Budd and Bhave, 2019;
Cullinane, 2016; Edwards, 2014; Heery, 2016a). There remain issues concerning
application of frames. Although both unitarist and Marxist frames are relevant, we
focus here specifically on ‘zones of contention’ within pluralism. A central tenet of
pluralism is ‘a widespread diffusion of power such that no one class or group or
stratum can dominate . . . the rest’ (Fox, 1979: 106). Pluralism has been a dominant
concept in public policy prescriptions regulating employment systems (e.g.
Donovan Commission, 1968), and a frame of reference long contested by indus-
trial relations (IR) scholars (Hyman, 1978). Contemporary ‘zones of contention’
persist within pluralism as a broad church, between a ‘radical-pluralist’ synthesis
and ‘neo-pluralist’ renaissance. Ackers (2019: 35) has been prominent in advancing
constructive debate about ‘pluralisms’, proposing ‘different approaches to
pluralist theory itself, and an intellectual framework where pluralism is always
in vibrant debate with alternative perspectives’. While agreeing with Ackers’
point about vibrant debates within pluralism, this article contests his criticisms
of radical-pluralism.
In advocating debate about application of pluralism ‘in action’, it is important
to revisit Fox’s (1979) crucial distinction between pluralism as a theoretical value
concept and the extent of its practical application. An important contribution,
therefore, is to illustrate that pluralism in ‘action’ (praxis) is neglected and differs
from pluralism as a ‘concept’. The article also draws on empirical data, using
qualitative research methods to test the pluralist frame in practice, and reveal
what differences in context (e.g. internal/workplace and external/country compar-
ison) add to knowledge about pluralist frames, particularly its praxis. Specifically,
we contrast pluralist approaches in two unionised transport sector organisations
(RailCo and BusCo) in the comparative country contexts of the UK and Republic
of Ireland.
The next section reviews literature and debates relating to ‘zones of contention’
within contemporary IR pluralism. The ‘Case contexts and methods’ section out-
lines the case contexts and qualitative research methods. The findings are reported
next, illustrating three distinctive (radical) pluralist themes: (1) contextualising
employment relations, (2) asymmetrical power relations and (3) structured antag-
onism. Case study evidence reveals variation at micro, meso and macro levels in
pluralist praxis across country contexts. The article finishes with a discussion and
implications for policy and (pluralist) value praxis.
‘Zones of contention’ within IR pluralism
There is common ground between neo-pluralists and radical-pluralists, especially
about the quantifiable features of the demise of collective bargaining, joint regu-
lation and pluralist institutions (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013), leaving an employee
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representation gap (Towers, 1997). There is consensus among pluralisms, therefore,
of the need to revitalise pluralist values and policies that may enhance or re-
stimulate democracy in workplaces and society. Ackers (2014) raises fundamental
issues, observing that work relations are ‘mostly’ asymmetrical, that ‘many but not
all’ actors interpret policy in different ways in different contexts, and that empirical
enquiry is required.
Nonetheless, there are theory and practice points of divergence between ‘neo-
pluralism’ and ‘radical-pluralism’. The radical-pluralist synthesis originated from a
critique of classical pluralist reformism by Fox (1973, 1974, 1979, 1985) and
Goldthorpe (1974). Radical-pluralism ‘recognises the plurality of groups and inter-
ests in society (and welcomes social pluralism in principle) whilst observing the
more basic patterns of power and inequality which tend to shape, and be shaped by
it’ (Watson, 2017: 344). The essence of radical-pluralism is the argument that the
bases of conflict and consent are deeper and more socially embedded in structures
of power, authority and inequality in workplaces and wider society than classical
pluralism acknowledges. These analytical foundations have subsequently been
built on by other radical-pluralists (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004; Edwards, 1986,
2014, 2018 – who prefers the term materialists; Gold, 2017; Watson, 2017).
Radical-pluralists (materialists) draw on theoretical insights from Marxism, but
maintain distance from ‘political’ Marxists prescribing potentially violent revolu-
tionary overthrowing of the prevailing wider socio-economic system and possible
imposition of totalitarian governance (Edwards, 1986, 2014, 2018; Gold, 2017;
Thompson, 2010); or what Kaufman (2015) terms a ‘form of socialist unitarism’
(p. 281). That said, Marxism is also a very broad church.
Fox (1973, 1979) recognised that theorising radical reform of inequalities and
power relations in society, and workplaces, requires transformative enactment of
values: the praxis of pluralist principles through achievable action. In countries
(and workplaces) with acute structural inequalities of class, opportunity, power
and wealth, like the UK, it is unsurprising if social consensus and cooperation are
problematic and do not function as predicted. The result is that low-trust work
organisation and work orientations are more prevalent than high-trust relations
(Fox, 1974; Siebert et al., 2015). Edwards’ (1986, 2014, 2018) subsequent materi-
alist analysis of structured antagonism in the employment relationship has influ-
entially built on Fox, synthesising radical sociological with pluralist IR
scholarship. Central to Edwards’ (2003) radical-pluralist synthesis is the ‘funda-
mental nature of the employment relationship’, based on accumulation of surplus
value, structured antagonism, power imbalance and indeterminacy of the effort-
reward bargain. Turning to capitalist social structures, there is a relation of ‘struc-
tured antagonism’ between capital and labour, comprehensively theorised by
Edwards (1986, 2014, 2018). Structured antagonism reflects ‘managerial strate-
gies . . . about the deployment of workers’ labour power in ways which permit a
generation of a surplus’ (Edwards, 2003: 16–17). Antagonism is structurally
embedded within capitalist employment relationships, deriving from ‘workers
[being] subjected to the authority of management and the need to plan production
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in accord with the needs of capitalist accumulation’ (Edwards, 1986: 5). Employers
require workers’ creative capacities to labour but cannot concede free rein because
of the need to extract a surplus and maintain control over work activities. This
includes the public sector, where work is increasingly organised along private
sector capitalist market-driven principles, notably marketisation, outsourcing
and competition (Edwards, 2014; Hastings, 2003).
The radical-pluralist synthesis has been challenged by contemporary
‘neo-pluralists’, noticeably Ackers (2002, 2005, 2014, 2019). Ackers (2014: 2618–
2623) identifies five empirical objections to radical-pluralism, which together ‘sug-
gest that questions of power, conflict and collective behaviour at work are better
explained by political and socio-economic context than by any essential features of
the capitalist employment relationship’. Three specific criticisms of RP stand out
and are questioned and unpicked in this article: a ‘methodological problem’
(alleged preference for structural generalisation over concrete empirical evidence);
an ‘ideological problem’ (an alleged Marxian emphasis on power imbalance and
conflict over cooperation); and alleged failure to explore public policies supporting
workplace cooperation, including partnership (Ackers, 2014: 2621).
These RP objectives can be refuted both conceptually and, as we report later,
empirically in terms of pluralist praxis. Neo-pluralism revives Durkheim’s analysis
about how moral communities and social institutions bond work and society
together. It is these original Durkheimian functionalist roots, seeking integration,
cooperation, stability and order, that Ackers (2014) argues are wrongly severed by
radicals. Recent neo-pluralist revival prioritises ‘positive’ employment relations
and collaborative mutual gains through labour–management partnership
(Ackers, 2014, 2019; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2016). Through social partnership,
neo-pluralism endorses a normative consensual order for advancing employee par-
ticipation as an alternative to adversarial Marxist goals of workers (unions) chal-
lenging capitalism. Indeed, partnership can at times achieve desirable and
collaborative redistributive goals. However, such a goal is not always realised or
achievable in actual practice. Furthermore, neo-pluralist institutional functional-
ism neglects elements of Durkheim’s original analysis, specifically emphasising
structural equality of opportunity and fairer redistribution of ownership and
wealth as essential preconditions for realising social consensus (Gold, 2017).
Ackers’ (2014) critique of (materialist) radical-pluralism wrongly conflates it
with revolutionary Marxism and mistakenly suggests that radical-pluralists accen-
tuate conflict over cooperation. Conflict and cooperation do coexist as key features
of radical-pluralism, and consensual social dialogue is a desirable end goal. The
neo-pluralist view is to presume that adversarial conflict-based interests are both
counterproductive and self-defeating within competitive capitalist markets. In con-
trast, cooperative mutuality through social partnership is perceived to generate
higher quality employment outcomes. However, radical-pluralist (materialist)
analysis recognises that antagonism is a ubiquitous structural undercurrent. But
this is very different than saying it explicitly ‘advocates’ conflict as a preferred
modus operandi and/or that conflict is omnipresent at the surface level in daily
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effort–reward bargains. In short, radical-pluralist analysis injects a nuanced dia-
lectic of degrees of both ‘cooperation’ and ‘conflict’ on a variable spectrum.
Cooperation is a more prevalent day-to-day phenomenon than conflict, otherwise
organisations would become mired in anarchy and not survive. Of significance is
that cooperation and consensus are shaped by structural (in)equalities and insti-
tutions mitigating labour decommodification that exist in different country con-
texts and organisational rules at any one time.
In developing the case for radical-pluralism, several zones of contention within
pluralisms are identified below: (1) unequal power relations; (2) antagonism, con-
flict and cooperation; (3) capital and labour interest formation; (4) contextualising
employment relations over both space and time; and (5) policy enactment (and
non-enactment) relating to pluralist values versus realisation (praxis).
Unequal power relations
Respective frames make different assumptions about power relations between
actors (Heery, 2015, 2016a, 2016b). Radical-pluralism is well-placed to incorporate
nuanced analysis of power dynamics. It advances theoretical insights that struc-
tural imbalances of power characterise employment relationships under capitalist
exchange, which shapes the behaviour of actors, processes and outcomes. Power
imbalance is reflected in employers’ ownership of capital and the means of pro-
duction, and workers’ needs to secure subsistence to survive. The decision of when,
where and how to invest capital provides employers with fundamental power to
permit or deny individuals possibilities to become or remain workers. Employers
have authority over hiring and firing, and control organisational decision-making.
Even where unions (and workers) exert some influence over the ‘frontier of control’
in workplaces, this is mostly narrowly restricted to economic issues around defend-
ing the immediate effort–reward bargain, rather than broader participative indus-
trial democracy (Goodrich, 1920; Hughes and Dobbins, 2021; Hyman, 2016).
Imbalance is more than an initial condition. Capital, crystallised in liquid
money, is possessed of mobility inaccessible to more geographically rooted work-
ers, and this capital mobility has intensified under the financialised phase of capital
accumulation (Thompson, 2013).
Neo-pluralism rejects in-built power imbalance within capitalism. Neo-
pluralists avoid this because it is deemed to ignore fluctuations in power, instead
preferring to treat power as an empirical assessment of who achieves what in a
given situation (Ackers, 2014: 2618). Yet a big reason for Fox’s ‘road to
Damascus’ conversion from orthodox pluralism to radical-pluralism in the early
1970s was his realisation that assuming power balance in capitalist exchange rela-
tions is mistaken, because of unequal access to power between the controllers of
capital and workers whose livelihoods depend on employers’ decisions. Like Lukes
(2005), Fox (1985) recognised the complex faces of power in both its visible and
invisible guises. Radical-pluralism further refines imbalances with regard to ‘power
over’ and ‘power to’ distinctions (Edwards, 2006; Lukes, 2005). Some Marxists still
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view power too deterministically through the prism of one economic class (capital-
ists) exerting ‘power over’ and dominating and controlling another economic class
(workers), assuming that wider class struggle emerges from this exploitative power
differential. Conversely, unitarists and pluralists tend to exaggerate the function-
alist scope of ‘power to’ achieve orderly cooperative mutual gains under contem-
porary neoliberal capitalist political economy.
Antagonism, conflict and cooperation
There is contention between radical-pluralists and neo-pluralists (and Marxists)
about antagonism, conflict and cooperation at work. The radical-pluralist
(materialist) concept of structured antagonism (Edwards, 1986, 2003, 2014,
2018) between capital and labour need not imply that capitalists and workers
will meet as opposing classes with clearly opposed interests. Yet nor should anal-
ysis go to the other extreme of denying that such embedded antagonisms exist. In
conceptualising structured antagonism, Edwards (1986: 5) suggests that ‘conflict is
the more basic principle’ than cooperation because ‘workers’ ability to work is
exploited for it is deployed in the creation of a surplus that goes to another group’.
However, Edwards is clear that underlying antagonism does not mean that conflict
will manifest itself. This will depend on how employment relations are managed in
different empirical contexts, indicating different levels of analysis. In contrast,
mainstream pluralism portrays conflict as a temporary rather than underlying
structural phenomenon in employment relationships (Budd, 2004).
It is arguably a moot point whether conflict is the ‘more basic principle’ than
cooperation: each is likely to vary by context. However, for Edwards (1986: 10), it
is only after the underlying structural antagonism that ‘cooperation comes in’,
shaping then how work relations are organised. Cooperation is structurally fun-
damental given daily mutual dependency, albeit asymmetric, between employers
and workers: the existence of one actor is conditioned by the existence of the other,
and for exploitation to occur requires cooperative exchanges of some sort, even
under conditions of compulsion or expedient compliance (Fox, 1985). An under-
lying antagonism is not the same as conflict, and both conflict and cooperation can
be equally present (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004: 38).1 A limitation with other IR
frames of reference is too much relative focus on either conflict or cooperation, at
the expense of the dialectical interplay and combination.
There are degrees and combinations of conflict and cooperation patterns. It is
important to foster improved conceptual understanding of cooperation and how it
intersects with conflict (see Bray et al., 2020). Cooperation in the employment
relationship is defined by Bray et al. (2020) as ‘managers, workers and their rep-
resentatives, if any, working together towards the same end’ (p. 118). We might
only say conflict is more fundamental than cooperation if we accept that the
dynamics of exploitation objectively conflict with interests and concerns of work-
ers. Yet workers often actively consent to, or at least comply with, their own
exploitation in the labour process. Burawoy (2013: 533) observes that exploitation
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has become ‘a privilege desired by ever more people’, characterised by a precariat,
rather than Marxist proletariat, ‘desperately seeking to defend its exploitation’.
Potentially, Polanyi’s (1957) analysis of waves of market fundamentalism offers
valuable insight under contemporary financialised capitalism. Commodification of
labour through free exchange in self-regulating markets threatens workers’ capac-
ity to engage in productive activity to sustain themselves and their families, with
destructive consequences for human existence in an economic system (capitalism)
where most people depend on paid work to survive (Burawoy, 2013: 533–534).
This constitutes coercive compliance through despotism in situations where work-
ers perceive the power balance so overwhelmingly imbalanced against them – far
from willing commitment (Wood, 2020).
Capital and labour interest formation
Workers may resist or consent to their exploitation and commodification, coop-
erate in producing surplus value, depending on how they experience and perceive
their situations and concerns in specific contexts. A framework of concerns exists
(Belanger and Edwards, 2007; Edwards et al., 2006), whereby capital and labour
each have two distinct sets of ‘concerns’ shaping conflict and cooperation: ‘control’
of the workplace and ‘developmental’ concerns. ‘Control’ concerns encompass
who exerts ‘power over’ work relations, including the extent of management
power to hire and fire workers, how work is allocated and by whom. In contrast,
longer term ‘developmental’ concerns involve positive sum mutual gains and
‘power to’ generate cooperation. Potential for conflict always exists, even where
common developmental concerns are identified (Belanger and Edwards, 2007:
715). Moreover, radical-pluralist scholarship explains why workplace compro-
mises, where control and developmental concerns are in sync for both parties,
may be rare and/or unsustainable, especially under liberal market regimes
(Belanger and Edwards, 2007; Dobbins and Dundon, 2017). Neo-pluralist opti-
mism about diffusing mutual gains compromises appears misplaced, given global
economic contexts where ‘power over’ mostly favours employer concerns by
squeezing more effort out of workers. To this end, normative judgements can
identify ‘real interests’ (Edwards, 2015a, 2015b), for example when workers
develop collective solidarity ‘because they are workers’ (Simms, 2012: 113, empha-
sis original), without arguing that solidarity will actually be pursued and realised.
Workers and managers have sets of real interests (or concerns) due to their
materialist positions in capitalist labour processes.
Importantly, Heery (2010) identifies different dimensions of (real) interests:
‘workers are reasoning subjects . . . [who] require effective institutions of represen-
tation to allow their participation in decisions that determine their incomes, job
security, and quality of working life’ (p. 546). On this basis, interests can be exam-
ined along four dimensions: level: workplace, national, international level; diversity
(e.g. gender-related interests may shape other sets of interests regarding
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representation); range of issues, including skill and job quality; depth, do they
encompass the immediate status quo, an incremental improvement or wider
social change?
Contextualising employment relations over both space and time
Contextualising employment relations is another zone of contention. For neo-
pluralists, the employment relationship is no more important than other social
exchanges in wider society (Ackers, 2014: 2622). But, there remain solid grounds
for insisting that the employment relationship warrants special attention (see
Budd, 2020). Ackers (2014) has challenged radical-pluralist conceptualisation of
the employment relationship for over-generalising in claiming insights into the
nature of ‘all paid work’, when this can only be addressed by empirical research
into local context and institutions. For Ackers, radical-pluralist analysis, once the
employment relationship is presented, descends into institutional detail indistin-
guishable from standard empirical pluralism (Ackers, 2014). Better, Ackers (2005:
540) maintains, to start with institutional analysis:
Once we start asking important questions, such as why are there more strikes in
manufacturing than in retail, or more in France than in the UK, the employment rela-
tionship per se can tell us little, the labour process not so much more. Instead, we turn to
institutions (in their broadest sense) for explanation. And were these institutions grown
from the seed of an employment relationship? Well, yes, in a certain very generic sense, as
with trade unions and employer associations, but they grew on very different soil, in
traditional societies that existed before capitalism, and shaped its local development. The
employment relationship is a useful ideal type to build IR around, but institutions are the
historical forces that pour life into it.
This criticism is misplaced. That analysing the employment relationship can only
generate contextualised tendencies rather than blanket explanation is not some-
thing radical-pluralists would refute, particularly those espousing critical realist
methodologies and identifying ‘tendential powers’ (Edwards et al., 2014;
Fleetwood, 2013; Thompson and Vincent, 2010). Indeed, that institutions matter
along with cultural nuances unpicking the identity of space and place have long
chimed with radical scholarship (see Thompson and Harley, 2012). For example,
Beynon’s (1973) Working For Ford, an exemplar of shopfloor militancy, identified
how external family and community life on Merseyside shaped shop steward
behaviour. Edwards and Scullion (1982) demonstrate how management control,
resistance and consent vary in workplaces, even when factories are owned by the
same firm and located in the same area and product market.
Moreover, taking a vital insight from labour process theory, the employment
relationship has ‘relative autonomy’ from external contextual influences; ‘relative’
in the sense that external factors shape conflict and cooperation, but ‘autonomous’
because the degree of influence external factors exert depends on specific
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contextual circumstances (Edwards, 1990: 133–134; Thompson, 2010). Therefore,
interpretation of ‘structured antagonism’ as generating tendencies rather than ‘iron
laws of motion’ means that (non-Marxist materialist) radicals refute deterministic
assumptions of ‘spill over’ effects from external conditions to workplaces. For
example, unlike some Marxists, they do not assume an automatic/linear correla-
tion that capitalist accumulation regimes generate workplace conflict/resistance
and politicised struggles against capitalism more generally (Dundon and
Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 2014; Thompson and Vincent, 2010). Worker and
employer ‘concerns’ evolve historically and are sculpted by contextualised circum-
stances, including institutions. ‘Concerns’ should not simply be deterministically
read-off from systemic capitalist structures and assumed to be homogeneous or
singular (Belanger and Edwards, 2007). Therefore, Ackers (2014: 2610) opens up
an unnecessary division between structural sociology and historical institutionalism.
Both matter for radical-pluralist analysis (Gold, 2017).
Policy enactment and non-enactment (values versus praxis)
Adopting the normative vision of accommodative pluralism and mutual gains
employment relationships, neo-pluralism maintains that scholarship will exercise
greater policy relevance, and contribute to a good society based on positive
employment relations (Ackers, 2014, 2019). Ackers (2014) is critical of radical-
pluralist pessimism about public policy prospects for diffusing workplace cooper-
ation. However, neo-pluralists overstate the potential for realising pluralist values
like integrative cooperation and mutuality/social partnership in the contemporary
political economy context of neoliberal capitalist accumulation (notably permissive
voluntarism in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) like the UK). Revisiting Fox’s
(1979) crucial distinction, radical-pluralists may endorse measures like mutuality
and industrial democracy as part of a liberal pluralist set of values (something that
ought to be), while also realistically reasoning that industrial democracy is largely
unrealisable in practice under currently existing capitalism. Endorsement of plu-
ralist values is very different from believing that robust enduring cooperation is
realisable through existing institutions and policies.
Neo-pluralism does not satisfactorily address Fox’s (1979) vital distinction.
Indeed, radicals have criticised contemporary pluralists for over-exaggerating
prospects for mutuality, cooperation and workplace order, and for moving too
far towards managerialist unitarism in accommodating collaborative ‘new realism’
prioritising business performance (Dundon and Dobbins, 2015; Heery, 2015,
2016a, 2016b; Thompson, 2013). For example, neo-pluralists argue that unions
can only survive by engaging in partnership with management, by ‘adding value to
the business organization’, contributing ‘to business success’ (Ackers, 2019: 44). In
so doing, they risk being sucked into the vortex of managerialist performativity
and neoliberalism like unitarists, omitting that many employers are unwilling (or
unable) to engage in partnership or share power with employee representatives.
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This reality is also reflected by gradual erosion of collective forms of (pluralistic)
worker participation in practice: from industrial democracy/co-determination, to
robust management–union cooperation, to non-union employee representation
(NER), to individual employee involvement, to employee engagement. As the ter-
rain for cooperation diminishes more and more, so do neo-pluralist expectations
and prescriptions. For example, Johnstone et al. (2010) suggest that NER is better
than nothing, concluding that when assessing effectiveness of partnership or
worker participation more generally, there is a need to re-consider benchmarks
for success, and to set them in contemporary employment relations realities. This
claim is contentious. NERs often lack required independence from management to
function as robust voice mechanisms, though voice efficacy depends on context
(Dobbins and Dundon, 2020; Tuckman and Snook, 2014). Moreover, why should
(pluralistic) praxis, under the rubric of business realism, be so limited to the lowest
common denominator of accepting crumbs from the employer table? What about
emancipation and industrial democracy as a fundamental human rights yardstick
for worker participation? (Hyman, 2016b). As Heery (2016b) observes,
Whereas the use of business performance as an evaluative criterion relies upon neolib-
eralism’s own standard in assessing pluralist institutions, the advocates of labour rights
and the social justice standard are less willing to appease neoliberalism or submit to its
hegemony. (p. 12)
Radical-pluralists do not assume that capitalism creates an iron cage closing off all
public policy choices for good employment relations. Capitalism has ‘system’
effects, but these are not deterministically totalising, interacting with ‘societal’
effects in different countries, and ‘dominance’ effects from the most powerful
nations (Dobbins and Dundon, 2017; Smith and Meiksins, 1995). Public policy
possibilities for cooperation are more wide-ranging in countries with the highest
equality of opportunity, notably Nordic/Northern European states.
Emphasis by radical-pluralists on constraints of structure and power in the
employment relationship does not imply that policy interventions supporting
cooperative endeavours between employers and workers (unions) are unobtain-
able, even in the UK. On the contrary, radical-pluralists recognise alternative ways
of managing employment relations, identifying various public policy interventions
aimed at advancing good employment relations (e.g. see Sisson, 2016, 2020). This
includes, for example, conditions required for workplace compromises to endure
(Belanger and Edwards, 2007; Dobbins and Dundon, 2017); policy changes
required to enhance mutual gains from employee information and consultation
regulations (Dobbins et al., 2017); job quality (Findlay et al., 2017; Sisson, 2016);
workers’ rights (Sisson, 2020) and worker-owned cooperatives (Wren, 2020).
The essence of a radical-pluralist approach regarding public policy possibilities
is more realistic than neo-pluralism, in terms of remaining conscious of structural
constraints on sustaining cooperative workplace bargains within contemporary
capitalist economies, especially LMEs like the UK. This is because the radical-
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pluralist sees the employment relationship embedded within an increasingly dys-
functional marketised system. Providing theoretical and empirical insights into
such turbulent structural constraints helps to explain why favoured neo-pluralist
policy prescriptions like workplace partnership may occur under specific condi-
tions, but have often proved so disappointingly difficult to diffuse and sustain,
even when employers and employees want collaborative bargains to endure
(Thompson, 2013).
Awareness of structural constraints does not discount progressive policy
reform, but is necessary for realism in better understanding the challenges and
opportunities affecting realisation of pluralist values (see Edwards, 2014; Fox,
1979; Sisson, 2016). This is more realistic than simply stating that cooperation
should be at the centre of public policy because it is a good normative orderly
vision of how workplaces and society should function. The next section briefly
outlines the case contexts and methodology.
Case contexts and methods
The article draws on empirical data to compare pluralist praxis patterns in two
highly unionised, state-owned, public sector transport organisations in two coun-
try contexts: the UK and the Republic of Ireland (RoI). RailCo in the UK employs
around 17,500 workers, while BusCo in the RoI employs around 3500. Like many
other public sector organisations, marketisation, competition and other private
sector principles have impacted in recent years, fuelling restructuring and cost-
cutting strategies in both organisations. Market-driven change in the public
sector has been more extensive in the UK/RailCo context. While management
of change in both organisations remains subject to a degree of joint regulation
through formal collective agreements, union and worker influence has decreased in
recent years, but more so at RailCo. The cases are important for demonstrating
how marketisation combines with other contextual factors to shape conflict/coop-
eration dialectics in British and Irish public transport sectors.
How country contexts impact IR in both cases is revealed further in the find-
ings. A key national-level difference between cases is that while the Thatcher gov-
ernment implemented a unitarist neoliberal revolution in the UK, Ireland
adopted a softer, more pluralistic ‘social partnership’ model until its breakdown
in 2009. Social partnership collapsed after the 2008 financial crisis, largely due to
public sector cost-cutting strategies and austerity (Dobbins and Dundon, 2016;
Regan, 2017). Union power in Ireland has diminished, but not as sharply as
in the UK.
The article uses qualitative research methods: semi-structured interviews, eth-
nographic non-participant observation and documents (e.g. newsletters, collective
bargaining agreements, union press releases). Interviews were conducted between
August 2016 and August 2017. At UK-based RailCo, interviewees included four
train managers, four station supervisors, two former senior managers, one member
of current senior management and two marketing and communications managers.
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At UnionUK-A, interviews were conducted with 2 lay members, 20 workplace
employee representatives (from trains, stations, cleaning and engineering), 3
national executive members and 2 other head office employees. Four workplace
representatives were interviewed from UnionUK-B, along with eight lay member
drivers, three national executive members and one official. At UnionUK-C, two
national executive members, two other head office employees, two station work-
place representatives and two lay members were interviewed. RailCo workers are
mainly represented by UnionUK-A and UnionUK-B.
In Ireland, three senior BusCo managers and seven garage-level managers were
interviewed. BusCo workers are mainly represented by UnionROI-A and
UnionROI-B. UnionROI-A interviews included 15 workplace representatives, 10
lay members, 2 national executive members, 2 union officials and 2 other union
employees. In UnionROI-B, 15 workplace representatives, 10 lay members and 2
national executive members were interviewed. Additionally, one UnionROI-C cler-
ical representative was interviewed. The study primarily focuses on RailCo and
BusCo drivers, but interviews with other grades were important to analyse driver
power relative to other grades. Ethnographic notes from observing and talking to
drivers on shift and during breaks provided valuable comparative insights into job
demands, co-worker relationships, manager–worker and customer–driver interac-
tions, union rivalry and workplace cultures.
The data were analysed iteratively by oscillating between the data and literature
and applying a realist cross-country thematic analysis (Edwards et al., 2014). Data
were classified using qualitative codes drawn from the data, for example power,
conflict, cooperation, context, union rivalry, relative autonomy and manager–
worker concerns. Evidence of different codes was merged to create broader
themes (Mills et al., 2010). Themes were reviewed, combined and eliminated, gen-
erating three core themes, illustrated next in the findings.
Findings
This section uses empirical cross-country data from BusCo and RailCo to test the
pluralist frame of reference under three specific interrelated themes: (1) contextu-
alising employment relations, (2) asymmetrical power relations and (3) structured
antagonism.
Contextualising employment relations
State and manager imposition of private sector accumulation principles (e.g. neo-
liberalism, marketisation, competition, outsourcing, and precarity) into public
sector employment relationships significantly shapes IR in the UK and Ireland.
This is more acute in the UK, yet how it impacts workplace-level IR depends on
the nature of different employment relationships and the extent of joint consulta-
tion with unions over change. In the UK, employers like RailCo have expanded
externalisation of the employment relationship, with precarious, agency and
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outsourced contracts increasing. Some RailCo agency workers (e.g. cleaners) are
unionised, but their inferior working conditions compared to directly employed
RailCo staff have sparked numerous disputes. Significantly, they can be substitut-
ed by other agency workers during strikes.
That said, RailCo drivers are one of the few occupational worker groups who
can still mobilise relatively strong bargaining power collectively during IR strug-
gles in the UK context. However, drivers referred to how union power in RailCo
and the UK generally has declined significantly since Thatcherism: ‘The UK
labour movement is much smaller since Thatcherism. Even in transport organisa-
tions where workers tend to have more power it knocks their confidence. Workers
can feel isolated’ (UnionUK-A representative).
The UK Trade Union Act 2016 constrains UK strike organisation because
unions must meet stricter balloting/voting thresholds. RailCo ballots usually
meet the thresholds, but they still place additional pressure on RailCo representa-
tives: ‘The Trade Union Act demonstrates the government’s anti-union approach.
Even if we meet the thresholds, other less powerful UK industries may not which
can lower member confidence’ (UnionUK-B representative).
The continuing post-Thatcher neoliberal marketisation agenda foregrounds
‘modernisation’ and cost-saving: ‘The focus everywhere seems to be on cost-
cutting, efficiency, “value for money”. These strategies usually attack worker
terms and conditions’ (RailCo driver).
RailCo’s part-privatisation in 2003 was justified by the state as cost-efficient
modernisation. Working conditions, including pensions and travel benefits of
workers transferred to private companies, worsened, generating union–manager–
state hostility. Partial privatisation collapsed in 2010, but RailCo’s government
funding has decreased significantly since, stimulating cost reduction plans, tighter
control strategies and firmer management stances:
We need more funding. RailCo is always looking for new ways to cut costs, which
aggravates relationships with unions. (UnionUK-B representative)
RailCo is under financial constraints. There’s a lot of pressure on managers to get more
out of what we have. (RailCo manager)
Neoliberalism is comparatively less entrenched in the Irish public sector, partly
influenced by the social partnership model between 1987 and 2009. BusCo
respondents referred to how social partnership was softer and more consensus
oriented than Thatcherism:
Social partnership united everyone in society to some extent. Even workers in non-union
companies had pay rises. Then you had Thatcher over in the UK saying there’s no such
thing as society. (UnionUK-A representative)
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It reduced industrial conflict and got stakeholders together to discuss pay and other
matters. (BusCo senior manager)
However, respondents explained that centralised social partnership pacts did not
devolve deep democratic voice and influence to workers in day-to-day employment
relationships and it potentially disadvantaged industrially powerful workers:
Workers from various industries had a degree of voice through social partnership, but
that’s different to actually changing things day-to-day. (UnionROI-A representative)
During social partnership agreements were established to prevent strike action, but I
think we could have secured better working conditions through striking because of our
power. (UnionROI-B official)
BusCo drivers went on strike in 2000 and secured pay increases above the national
pay agreement, but in exchange for efficiency savings.
Respondents felt that social partnership values around tripartite collaboration
between government, unions and employers provided somewhat greater union
protection and delayed BusCo privatisation during the 2000s: ‘Social partnership
helped delay tendering because the government was obliged to engage in formal
discussions with unions about any reforms. Plus, the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern
supported social partnership and wanted it to continue.’
However, marketisation has recently intensified in Ireland, particularly since the
2008 financial crisis, subsequent recession and collapse of social partnership.
BusCo cost reduction plans were implemented, including redundancies and bus
fleet reduction. BusCo’s government funding has reduced, but less so than
RailCo’s. BusCo started re-accumulating profit in 2013 and its financial position
is more stable than RailCo’s. Nevertheless, in 2016 BusCo workers staged indus-
trial action over pay, and secured a pay rise in return for a ‘lean management’
programme.
Precarious contracts and outsourcing have increased in Ireland, but not as
widely as in the UK. The state recently tendered 10% of BusCo routes. During
the BusCo privatisation dispute, unions feared that the successful contractor
would not recognise unions: ‘In Ireland, unlike the UK, there’s no legislation
enforcing union recognition. This is a major issue in the private sector’
(UnionROI-A representative). However, the UK-based contractor, aware of
driver (union) industrial power and the long-running privatisation dispute, nego-
tiated a collective bargaining agreement with UnionROI-A.
A legally binding Registered Employment Agreement was established during
the BusCo tendering dispute to protect working conditions of drivers transferring
to the successful contractor. But driver transfer has provoked BusCo conflict over
working hours changes. Unions and BusCo managers also aimed to establish a
Sectoral Employment Order (SEO) regulating bus-industry pay and conditions.
Legally binding sectoral regulations that potentially help cement workplace
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consensus are absent in the UK, and only cover three industries in Ireland.
Moreover, their prerequisites are challenging. For example, unions must be sub-
stantially representative of all Ireland’s bus drivers, when many work for private
companies and ‘substantially representative’ has no definite quantitative measure.
Finally, the Labour Court must consider the SEO’s impact on industry
‘competitiveness’ before recommending that the minister (who may disagree)
establishes a SEO.
Asymmetrical power relations
Observations demonstrated that in both cases unions are still powerful due to high
membership density, driver position at point of service delivery, and their specialist
skills and knowledge (e.g. regarding driver/passenger safety), which cannot be
substituted during strike action:
It’s more about what we know than what we do. (RailCo driver)
If drivers decide they’re not doing something or they’re not coming to work it can have
major consequences. (RailCo manager)
Observations illustrated BusCo drivers navigating around traffic and pedestrians,
skills requiring extensive training. However, although BusCo and RailCo depend
on labour input, workplace power relations in both organisations are structurally
asymmetrical because workers depend on employers who control resources and
capital. Yet in both organisations, relatively well-paid drivers enjoy better working
conditions than many other working class blue-collar workers: ‘I wouldn’t get
another job with these terms and conditions, I haven’t been to university, I
don’t have any qualifications’ (RailCo driver).
BusCo management explained: ‘In the past we’ve had drivers leaving, but then
they come back after realising the grass isn’t greener the other side.’
Structurally imbalanced power relations restrict wider democratic union partic-
ipation in more substantive strategic level decisions and joint regulation of change.
Union concessions tend to reflect defending immediate day-to-day effort–bargain
issues. Furthermore, many strategic decisions are made by the state under market-
driven change, rather than by the RailCo and BusCo managers with whom unions
negotiate day to day. For example, BusCo did not want to tender routes, but a
manager said: ‘The government is our shareholder so you don’t bite the hand that
feeds you. We have to work with them. . .’
Similarly, RailCo’s part-privatisation did not sit well with managers: ‘We
weren’t necessarily comfortable with the arrangements but we had to try to
make it work.’
Employers tend to have better media portrayal than unions, especially in the
UK, further reflecting structurally unequal power relations: ‘Newspapers make us
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look greedy, we’re asking for more when we already have relatively good condi-
tions. But we get our conditions through challenging employer power’ (UnionUK-
B representative).
For instance, framing RailCo’s various recent marketisation strategies as ‘mod-
ernisation’ in company disclosures and news media helps RailCo secure public
support and highlight customer-focused strategies, while depicting unions as old-
fashioned and hindering progress. Similarly, BusCo’s tendering was justified by
Ireland’s government in the media as enhancing value for money and customer
service. Negative media coverage does not seem to weaken driver solidarity signif-
icantly. It may reinforce stronger occupational identities as only fellow drivers
understand their work experiences. Nonetheless, it can affect union power and
morale by diluting public support. Public support for BusCo workers during dis-
putes seems greater than for RailCo workers. This could be due to comparatively
less abrasive media reporting of unions in Ireland. Observations also indicated that
daily interactions between BusCo drivers and passengers foster bonds, whereby
drivers are perceived as people with needs and concerns, rather than just bus
drivers: ‘Regular passengers wish us good luck before strikes and say they hope
we get what we want’ (UnionROI-B representative).
Observations revealed that RailCo drivers are usually in their cabs, invisible
from passengers, thereby lessening interpersonal interaction. Notwithstanding,
BusCo drivers sometimes dislike passenger interaction and can experience abuse.
Union rivalry in both cases can constrain union (and worker) ability to resist
management. For instance, some company proposals advantage or disadvantage
one union’s membership more than the other, thereby dividing workforces.
UnionUK-A is traditionally more militant than UnionUK-B. In some cases,
UnionUK-A organises all-grades action but UnionUK-B does not. This occurred
during a modernisation dispute over closing RailCo ticket offices, where
UnionUK-A argued that fewer station workers would hinder driver and passenger
safety. Drivers who did not perceive the issue as a significant driver concern could
avoid striking by transferring to UnionUK-B. RailCo station workers occupy
a relatively weaker position and have been substituted during strikes. This
can divide drivers, with some strongly advocating grade solidarity but others feel-
ing that drivers ‘carry weaker grades’. Senior RailCo managers tended to distin-
guish between unions, claiming that ‘Some want to engage, but others immediately
oppose change’.
BusCo managers did not differentiate between unions but emphasised union
rivalry:
We have two strong driver unions and almost by nature if you’re making progress on a
particular issue and one of them is inclined to agree with you, almost inevitably the other
one won’t. If I had a frustration it would be that we spend an awful lot of time going
around that circle.
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Constant switching between BusCo unions occurs: ‘You’ll have a member in the
morning, he’ll be gone by the afternoon’ (BusCo representative).
A UnionROI-A representative referred to UnionROI-B introducing cheaper
driver insurance with a non-union company. UnionROI-A must deal with union-
ised external organisations and they initially lost 600 members until a unionised
insurance company matching UnionROI-B’s price was identified. However, BusCo
unions tend to strike together, although their specific position during disputes may
differ, sometimes significantly.
Structured antagonism
Antagonism between employers and workers (and their unions) in
both cases is integral to the employment relationship because of structural
power imbalances discussed above. However, antagonism must be analysed
at multiple levels because whether observable conflict surfaces depends on
empirical circumstances. Importantly, cooperation is a more prevalent day-to-
day feature of the employment relationship and effort–reward bargain, notably
at BusCo:
I think we get on well with union reps here. We disagree sometimes, we have our rows, I
shout at them, they shout back, but in general. (BusCo garage manager)
You can’t keep beating the drum, you will get nothing out of that. You can play it
sometimes, but you can’t just keep beating it. (BusCo representative)
In both cases, managers and workers share common developmental concerns gen-
erating cooperation and mutuality, like over health and safety, training and, most
fundamentally, company survival. For instance, during the BusCo tendering dis-
pute, unions and managers wanted to protect the company through BusCo
growth:
BusCo growth is important for workers and managers, we’re competing against private
sector bus companies. (UnionROI-A representative)
If we lose routes, growth will be really important. (BusCo manager)
However, the state, managers and workers may have alternative views about how
to meet shared concerns which can stimulate conflict. Accordingly, in both cases,
combinations of conflict and cooperation exist. Collective agreements (e.g. over
attendance, discipline, work allocation) demonstrate more cooperative compro-
mises between managers and unions and degrees of joint regulatory decision-
making over work organisation and change. Yet lower level managers may not
always fully agree with compromises:
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I agree with some agreements but others I think why are we agreeing to this? This isn’t in
the best interest of the customer, or the fare paying public. (RailCo manager)
Allocating everything based on seniority is fair, which is important, but I think it would
sometimes be better to interview for particular routes. (BusCo manager)
However, BusCo managers and unions are generally likely to negotiate more
robust collective agreements in a comparatively less antagonistic manner than at
RailCo, and strike action is less frequent.
Driver responses to patterns of conflict/cooperation vary at RailCo because
individual worker concerns are diverse: ‘We’re never going to please everyone.
Members prioritise different, sometimes contradictory things’ (UnionUK-A
official).
Members may participate in strikes to avoid crossing picket lines and offending
co-workers, but have reservations:
If we’re striking for better pay and I lose pay by striking it defeats the object really, but
you do it. Although unions have secured very good working conditions for us, I would
like them to fight for other things like longer breaks. (RailCo driver)
During single union disputes, some members in non-striking unions respect picket
lines. This varies by depot: ‘I can’t cross a picket line, no matter who’s on strike’
(RailCo driver).
However, a UnionUK-B representative explained:
There’s been times when UnionUK-A are striking and when we say we’re not crossing
the picket line, management will say if you don’t come to work we’re booking you absent
and you’re going through disciplinary action. Some members get worried then.
Notwithstanding, despite varying worker interests, most drivers are concerned
about improving and defending material workplace conditions and pay when par-
ticipating in strikes, rather than resisting exploitation itself. ‘Some members have
strong political feelings, I want more of those. But for most, they want to come
into work, get the job done with decent working conditions, go home’ (UnionUK-
A representative).
BusCo/RailCo drivers mentioned how reciprocal employment relations have
weakened over time and managerial control over issues like punctuality, discipline,
attendance and work allocation has intensified. However, observations demon-
strated that in both cases line managers apply different styles, which shape degrees
of conflict/cooperation: ‘Some managers stick rigidly to the rule book and issues
get referred up to head office. Others apply more flexible approaches with unions’
(BusCo senior manager).
For example, a BusCo garage manager sometimes applies discretion over indi-
vidual issues (e.g. attendance) to gain union consent over bigger collective issues
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such as route scheduling changes, thus maintaining general control: ‘I prefer sort-
ing things in the garage, head office don’t want to hear from us they have enough
to do.’
A BusCo garage manager, described by a representative as ‘approachable’ and
‘helping drivers when he can’, stated: ‘I try to keep everybody happy. Keep the
driver happy, they come to work. You don’t, they go off sick and I have to explain
why routes are not covered.’
In both cases managers may ask union representatives to communicate with an
employee (e.g. for swearing offences) to stop conflict escalating further:
We can just say to reps, look, I think that person is going to get into trouble if they keep
doing this. Any chance that you can find out if they’ve got any problems that are making
them behave like this?
Generally, it seems that greater managerial discretion is applied at BusCo, result-
ing in comparatively more cooperation. At RailCo, drivers felt that more informal
give and take is applied by managers who were drivers previously, but such man-
agers are few and far between today: ‘If a manager’s been a driver they’re more
likely to understand job demands, this can help reduce conflict. It’s not always the
case though, it depends on the manager.’
Discussion
Ackers (2014, 2019) has provided valuable impetus to vibrant IR debates between
pluralisms. In that spirit, this article contests his critique of radical-pluralism,
backed by conceptualisation and empiricism. In doing so, the article draws on
cross-country empirical data to compare pluralist praxis patterns in two state-
owned public transport organisations affected by marketisation: BusCo in the
Republic of Ireland and RailCo in the UK. Two contributions are offered.
First, the article reveals ‘zones of contention’ (Heery, 2016a) within the contem-
porary pluralist frame of reference between the ‘radical-pluralist’ synthesis
(Dundon and Dobbins, 2015; Edwards, 2014, 2018) and ‘neo-pluralism’ (Ackers,
2002, 2005, 2014, 2019) under three interrelated themes: (1) contextualising
employment relations, (2) asymmetrical power relations and (3) structured antag-
onism. Our multi-level radical-pluralist analysis is presented in Table 1, illustrated
by empirical findings from the two case studies.
The findings illustrate that underlying ‘structured antagonism’ is omnipresent,
but does not always ignite surface conflict at BusCo or RailCo. Cooperation and
accommodation are evident through, for example, concession bargaining, recipro-
cal mutuality around common developmental concerns, along with informal day-
to-day give-and-take between workers and line managers. Cooperation and com-
promise are more widely institutionalised at BusCo than RailCo, although sus-
tained mutuality has reduced in both cases over time. Our BusCo case may at times
seem closer to ‘classical’ pluralism (e.g. advanced bargaining and joint decision-
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making arrangements displaying cooperative intentions). However, as at RailCo,
BusCo also displayed episodes of conflict and embedded antagonism, for example
strike action over route tendering. By foregrounding ‘structured antagonism’, a
radical-pluralist lens is better equipped to support multi-level analysis of how
pluralist praxis is itself nuanced and weaves in and out of fluid zones of contesta-
tion and cooperation. Unlike neo-pluralism, which gravitates too exclusively to the
cooperative dynamic, radical-pluralist praxis is as much about collective
agreement-making as it is the capacity to resist, as evidenced in uneven episodes
of conflict ‘and’ accommodation at both BusCo and RailCo. As we see it, radical-
pluralism is a synthesis of radical (sociological structuralism) and pluralist
(institutions) framing, so will inevitably reflect aspects of traditional pluralism
(bargaining, accommodation, rules, job regulation, etc.).
Contextualising employment relations in our case studies is crucial, but we
argue that neo-pluralism overlooks how proliferating private sector accumulation
practices and principles constrain diffusion and endurance of workplace coopera-
tion. In our study, this is comparatively more evident at RailCo, shaped by post-
Thatcher UK public sector marketisation. At surface level, social partnership in
Ireland may appear to reflect ‘classical’ pluralism by initially insulating Irish
unions somewhat from neoliberalism and marketisation, at least more than in
the UK. Notwithstanding, BusCo respondents questioned the depth of worker
influence and voice achieved during the social partnership years (1987–2009).
Moreover, neoliberalism and marketisation intensified in Ireland after the 2008
financial crisis and the social partnership’s collapse in 2009, though again, less so
than in the UK (Dobbins and Dundon, 2016; McDonough and Dundon, 2010;
Regan, 2017). Furthermore, Ireland has not enacted union recognition legislation,
arguably a key pluralist public policy measure (Dobbins et al., 2020). Additionally,
as found in the Irish manufacturing industry following the global financial crisis
and the collapse of a structured corporatist partnership arrangement, subsequent
robust sectoral collective bargaining has been decentralised, fragmented and often
uncertain (Hickland and Dundon, 2016); or at best, peppered with concession
bargains and union accommodations (Roche and Gormley, 2017). Against such
an uneven context, the BusCo case supports radical-pluralist assumptions by rec-
ognising both internal cooperative dynamics alongside structurally constrained
policy prescriptions in contemporary neoliberalised political economies like the
UK and Ireland. Such framing is arguably more nuanced and informed than
overly optimistic neo-pluralist assumptions around public policies advancing an
exclusivity favouring a presumed conflict-free social partnership model.
RailCo and BusCo unions are relatively strong compared to other sectors, due
to drivers’ positional power at the point of service delivery, high union membership
density and mobilisation strategies. Indeed, the very praxis of radical actions may
be necessary to mitigate employer power imbalances, something that is harder for
workers and unions in other contexts such as the gig economy (cf. Wood, 2020).
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Crucially, employers who own resources and capital tend to action ‘control over’
others (workers) who depend on selling their labour effort. In our case studies, the
state as ultimate employer adds additional layers of complexity, because workers
and their unions tend to interact and negotiate day to day with RailCo/BusCo
managers, rather than with government.
Regarding the second contribution, we illustrate that Fox’s (1979) radical-
pluralist distinction between pluralism as a ‘concept’ and pluralism in ‘action’
(praxis) is neglected by neo-pluralism. It is vital for all pluralists and pluralisms
to contest the growing hegemony of managerial unitarism manifest in much of
contemporary human resource management (HRM) research and practice
(Dundon and Rafferty, 2018; Godard, 2020). There is, however, a further risk
that neo-pluralism could enter the unitary household uninvited, then become
part of the furniture. We emphasise that radical-pluralism argues for more inclu-
sive democratic emancipatory alternatives for societal and workplace justice to
transform values into actions in workplaces and wider society. Progressive
public policy reforms focused on pluralist praxis are required to narrow discrep-
ancies between pluralism as a value concept, and its real world application. Neo-
pluralism understates the scale of progressive reforms required to change the status
quo, rather than just conform to it.
Conventional employment relations and HRM scholarship does not always
fully recognise and/or acknowledge the scale of assault on institutions of pluralist
collectivism by political neoliberalism (Peck, 2013; Thompson and Harley, 2012).
A key analytical contribution is that radical scholars examine capitalist structural
causal roots and systemic impacts to connect with outcomes, for example the
hollowing-out of pluralist institutions (e.g. trade unions, employers’ associations,
collective bargaining, social partnership) and ‘public good’ erosion by private
sector capitalist accumulation principles. Problematically, for public policy
reform, institutional pathways in LMEs like the UK and Ireland remain firmly
oriented towards a hegemonic unitarist frame that explicitly prioritises maximising
worker performativity and capital accumulation, over and above citizens’ demo-
cratic rights in workplaces and society (Hyman, 2016). Therefore, the prognosis for
pluralist social partnership and mutuality based on sustainable workplace ‘social
contracts’ is not optimistic when set against such embedded and unequal con-
straints. The state and many employers are increasingly offloading the risk ema-
nating from market turbulence onto workers, illustrated by expansion of a
commodified low-paid precarious reserve army of labour, competing to be
exploited by employers (Burawoy, 2013).
Consequently, while arguing that the radical-pluralist frame of reference offers
more refined synthesis of complex workplace social phenomena than neo-
pluralism, it also adds an applied utility of praxis. There is considerable scope
for future research and theoretical debates on framing pluralism(s) (and radical-
ism(s)), including comparative country research exploring comparable themes and/
or identifying new research dimensions for testing pluralism(s) in action.
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1. At the same time, Blyton and Turnbull (2004: 28) believe that scholarship should priori-
tise conflict and instability over order and stability, which again raises questions about
prioritisation of conflict over cooperation.
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